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IN RE SANTOS: EXTENDING THE RIGHT OF NON-
RETURN TO REFUGEES OF CIVIL WARS
Charles W. Cookson II*
El Salvador is a country mired in an eleven-year-old civil war. Since
1980, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and
the Salvadoran government's armed forces have fought for control of
El Salvador.' Current estimates number the FMLN's forces at six
thousand combatants, supported by urban commando and militia
groups. 2 There are 56,000 soldiers in the Salvadoran armed forces.3
This number includes 11,500 police officers, commonly known as the
security forces.4
Government security forces committed various human rights viola-
tions in an effort to repress attempts at insurgency.5 Eventually, both
the government security forces and the FMLN guerrillas had engaged
in physical and psychological torture of the civilian population by indis-
criminately bombing urban areas,6 threatening citizens and their fami-
lies,7 detaining persons and depriving them of minimal living condi-
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Corn uma mae assim,
eu queria ser crian~a para sempre.
1. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN IGHTS PRAcrIcEs FOR 1989, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE CoMui. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND THE HOUSE CoMiM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 569-70 (Joint Comm. Print
1990) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1989]. Congress consults these human
rights reports when considering whether to extend assistance to foreign countries under
the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et. seq. (1988) [hereinafter Foreign
Assistance Act]. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1989, at 1. Violations of human rights, as
defined by the Foreign Assistance Act, include torture or other cruel or degrading
treatment; prolonged detention without charges; disappearances due to abduction or
clandestine detention; and other flagrant denial of the rights to life, liberty, and the
security of the person. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1988).
2. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1989, supra note 1, at 569.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 570; AiNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 111-13 (1988)
[hereinafter AMINESTY INT'L].
6. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1989, supra note 1, at 569-70; INTER-AM.IERICAN Cout1.
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 1988-89 ANNUAL REPORT 166, OEA/ser. L./V./11.76, doe. 10
(1989) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
7. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1989, supra note 1, at 569, 573.
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tions,8 torturing political prisoners,9 and committing other arbitrary
violations of human rights. 10 Human rights reports charge paramilitary
death squads with murders and disappearances, yet the majority of
the individual members of the death squads remain unpunished." Over
70,000 people have died as a result of this conflict. 3 The conflict has
disrupted the lives of 525,000 people still living in El Salvador;',
55,000 Salvadorans have sought refuge in other Central American
countries and in Mexico, and 550,000 have illegally emigrated to the
United States.' 5 The magnitude of the Salvadoran refugee problem
demonstrates the disorder created by the civil war during the 1980s.
The United Nations General Assembly has adopted several resolutions
addressing both human rights violations and the refugee problem in El
Salvador.' 6 These resolutions urge all member-states to grant a safe
haven to the refugees and to support the independent organizations
that assist displaced Salvadorans remaining in El Salvador.' 7
8. Id. at 575-77; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 167; AMNESTY INT'L, supra
note 5, at 113.
9. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EL SALVADOR 'DEATH SQUADS' - A GOVERNMENT
STRATEGY 3-6 (1988) [hereinafter EL SALVADOR DEATH SQUADS].
10. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1989, supra note 1, at 570-79; ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 167; United Nations G.A. Res. 38/101, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
47), U.N. Doc. A/38/680 (1984); see also In re Sanchez and Escobar, I. & N. Dec.
2996 (B.I.A. 1985) (stating the evidence presented indicated a country-wide state of
anarchy in 1982 and the violence in El Salvador reached all segments of the civilian
population); In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781 (U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.) (decided Aug. 24,
1990) (finding the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) description of the civil war in
El Salvador in In re Sanchez and Escobar still reflects the prevailing conditions in El
Salvador today); Slowly, slowly, 318 ECONOMIST 39 (March 16, 1991) (describing re-
cent elections in El Salvador and United Nations-sponsored peace talks as bringing
hope for an end to the civil war).
11. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1989, supra note 1, at 572-73; ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 166-67; AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 5, at 111-13; EL SALVADOR
DEATH SQUADS, supra note 9, at 7-12.
12. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1989, supra note 1, at 572; G.A. Res. 101, 38 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 47), U.N. Doc. A/38/680 (1983); AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 5, at
113; see EL SALVADOR DEATH SQUADS, supra note 9, at 12-14 (describing how the
legal framework operates to shield "death squad" activities).
13. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 163.
14. COUNTRY REPORTS FOR 1989, supra note 1, at 582.
15. Id.
16. G.A. Res. 139, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53), U.N. Doc. A/40/1007 (1986);
G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/39/700 (1985); G.A. Res.
101, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47), U.N. Doc. A/38/680 (1984).
17. G.A. Res. 139, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53), U.N. Doc. A/40/1007 (1986);
G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51), U.N. Doc. A/39/700 (1985); G.A. Res.
101, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47), U.N. Doc. A/38/680 (1984).
IN RE SANTOS
To remain in the United States, an alien must qualify for either asy-
lum' or withholding of deportation under the Refugee Act of 1980
(Refugee Act)."9 The Refugee Act, which was incorporated into the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA),20 grants asylum to
applicants who establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they
have been persecuted in the past or that reasonable persons in similar
circumstances would have a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion. 2' Case law has established that an applicant
18. The term "asylum" comes from the Latin, meaning "an inviolable place where
a person in flight from pursuit takes refuge." Khan, Legal Problems Relating to Refu-
gees and Displaced Persons, I REcuEIL DES CoURs 287, 316 (1976). It is used when a
host country grants residence to an alien who has fled his or her native country and
who applies for asylum in the host country, rather than in the host country's consular
offices abroad. Comment, United States. Canadian, and International Refugee Law: A
Critical Comparison, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & Cohip. L. REv. 261, 263 (1988).
19. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., and at 22 U.S.C. § 2601).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1988). The federal government has plenary powers
over questions of exclusion and deportation of aliens and immigration. See The Chinese
Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (stating that the power to exclude aliens is
incident to the sovereignty held by the United States government, as part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 587-88 (1952) (stating the power to deport foreigners is inherent in
every sovereign state).
21. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158 (1988). The attorney general has discretionary
power to grant asylum. 8 U.S.C. §1158(a) (1988). See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987) (establishing that a well-founded fear of persecution is a sub-
jective standard). The alien's own testimony may suffice to prove a well-founded fear of
persecution when the testimony is consistent and sufficiently detailed, even in the ab-
sence of corroborative evidence. In re Mogharrabi, I. & N. Dec. 3028 at 10 (B.I.A.
1987). The alien who can establish evidence of past persecution is eligible for asylum
without showing a "well-founded fear of persecution." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(l)
(1991); In re Chen, I. & N. Dec. 3104 at 4 (B.I.A. 1989). The evidentiary burden of
proof is on the applicant under both tests. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (1991). The BIA an-
nounced a four-part test to measure the reasonableness of an applicant's fear in In re
Mogharrabi, I. & N. Dec. 3028, at 11 (B.I.A. 1987):
1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to overcome in
others by means of punishment of some sort;
2) the persecutor is already aware, or could become aware, that the alien pos-
sesses this belief or characteristic;
3) the persecutor has the capability of punishing the alien;
4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish the alien.
Id.
Asylum is discretionary and may still be denied even if the applicant successfully
establishes a "well-founded fear." 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(a) (1991). A grant of asylum
lasts for an indefinite period of time. 8 C.F.R. § 208.20 (1991). The applicant may,
after a period of one year, apply for permanent residency in the United States. 8
C.F.R. § 209.1 (1991).
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may qualify for withholding of deportation 22 by demonstrating a clear
probability of persecution.2
22. 8 U.S.C. §1253(h) (1988).
23. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 40'7, 413 (1984). The "clear probability" standard is
higher than that required for a grant of asylum, because it requires objective evidence
which demonstrates that it is more likely than not that the alien will be persecuted if
deported to his or her native country. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 430. Widespread
conditions of violence affecting the entire population in the applicant's native country
are not sufficient to establish persecution. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277,
1284-85 (9th Cir. 1984). While asylum is discretionary, the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) of the United States Department of Justice must grant withhold-
ing of deportation to all eligible applicants. Carvajal-Mufioz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562,
567-68 (7th Cir. 1984).
Even upon a showing of persecution, the INS shall deny asylum to an applicant
where the asylum-seeker resettled in a third country, has a serious criminal conviction,
where there are grounds to believe the refugee committed a serious crime, engaged in
the persecution of others, poses a danger to the security of the United States or where a
third country has made an outstanding offer to resettle the applicant and guarantee his
or her safety. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1988).
Compare § 1253(h)(2) with recent Italian immigration legislation which offers the
following grounds for exclusion:
4. An alien who intends to apply for refugee status will not be allowed entry into
the country when, upon objective examination by the border police it is ascer-
tained that:
a) the alien has been granted refuge in another state. This is subject to the
prohibition of deportation to a state where the alien will be persecuted on ac-
count of race, gender, language, nationality, religion, political opinion, social or
personal conditions, or where the alien would be at risk of being deported to a
third country which cannot guarantee protection from persecution;
b) the alien entered from a state, other than the state of his or her nationality,
which is a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, and where the alien resided
for a period of time, excluding any necessary transit time in traveling to reach
the Italian border. The same prohibition applies as in paragraph 4(a);
c) the alien is found in the conditions outlined in article 1, paragraph f of the
1951 Geneva Convention;
d) the alien has been convicted in Italy of a crime under article 380,
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code, or constitutes a danger to
the national security, or is associated with the mafia, with drug trafficking or
with terrorist organizations. Decree-Law No. 416, Gaz. Uff. n. 303, Leg. Ital. I
(Dec. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Decree-Law No. 416].
The Italian Parliament adopted a more liberal formulation of immigration legislation
than it previously employed. First, it abolished the "geographical limitation" which
barred non-Europeans from recognition as refugees under the 1951 Geneva Convention
and the 1967 Protocol. Decree-Law No. 416, art. 1, para. 1; see also Perluss and Hart-
man, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551,
565 & n.73 (1986) (stating that non-European refugees were only entitled to remain in
Italy in order to seek a more permanent solution if they met the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) definition of refugee). Second, the Parliament
stated that simple transit through another state no longer constitutes an action prejudi-
cial to an asylum application. Decree-Law No. 416, art. 1, para. 4(b); Caggiano, Asilo,
Ingresso, Soggiorno ed Espulsione dello Straniero nella Nuova Legge
sull'Immigrazione, XLV, LA COMMUNIT, INTERNAZIONALE 31, 41 (1990). It is inter-
esting to note that in art. 1, para. 4 the Italian Parliament gave the border police
unprecedented absolute authority to decide the fate of an asylum applicant who arrives
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Much controversy has surrounded the United States government's
policy toward illegal Salvadoran refugees. The United States Depart-
ment of State policy holds that Salvadoran refugees seeking refugee
status or asylum, in fact come to the United States primarily for eco-
nomic reasons.24 The Department of State claims the civil strife and
generalized violence in El Salvador do not qualify Salvadoran refugees
for asylum or withholding of deportation under the provisions of the
INA.25
Critics of the Department of State policy contend the deportation of
Salvadoran refugees places the refugees in danger of bodily harm or
death.2 6 These critics also claim this policy violates international law;
they demand that the United States grant temporary protection to all
Salvadoran refugees until the conditions in El Salvador improve enough
to allow for safe repatriation. Specifically, critics charge the United
at the border. Id. at 42. Caggiano believes that it would have been more appropriate to
allow competent central authorities to decide such cases. Id.
Italy recently received a wave of 20,000 refugees from Albania, putting the new
immigration laws to a test. Albania's Revenge, 318 ECONoMIsT 45 (March 16, 1991).
The Italian government stated that these were economic, not political refugees, yet
deputy prime minister Claudio Martelli, author of the immigration legislation, said
that an exception would be made for those Albanians who wished to stay. Id. at 45-46.
The incident seems to indicate that Italian authorities do not intend to liberally apply
the immigrations laws, even as a country of first refuge, and that the system of prelimi-
nary scrutiny by border police can not contain massive refugee migration and is there-
fore unworkable.
24. HOUSE Commu. ON RULES, REPORT ON TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPORTA-
TION OF CERTAIN DISPLACED SALVADORANS, H.R. REP. No. 755, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 4 (1986) [hereinafter CoMt. ON RULES REPORT] (indicating the State De-
partment believes overpopulation and poverty, coupled with El Salvador's, long-stand-
ing practice of encouraging emigration led the refugees to seek entry into the United
States). The Department of State issues an advisory opinion on each asylum case
through its Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) which in-
cludes a discussion of political conditions in the applicant's country. Comment, supra
note 18, at 264. The INS may wait for the BHRHA to issue an advisory opinion before
rendering a decision in an individual case. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11 (1991). These advisory
opinions heavily influence the decision of whether or not to grant asylum. Comment,
supra note 18, at 264. Critics argue that these advisory opinions lack objectivity be-
cause of the inherent political contradictions. Id. at 265. Opinions acknowledging
human rights violations in countries receiving United States military aid would be con-
trary to section 2304 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Id. Section 2304(a)(2) prohibits
the United States government from granting military aid to countries with persistent
human rights violations. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1988).
25. COMM. ON RULES REPORT, supra note 24, at 4.
26. Id. at 4-5.
27. Id. at 4. See also Comment, supra note 18, at 261 (describing the case of a
Salvadoran whose denial of asylum and subsequent deportation ultimately ended in his
violent death). Critics further contend that this denial of temporary protection results
directly from the United States' supportive foreign policy towards the Salvadoran gov-
ernment. COMM. ON RULES REPORT, supra note 24, at 5. Granting temporary protec-
tion to refugees is equivalent to the United States admitting that the Salvadoran gov-
1991]
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States with evading an international customary norm of non-return
which prohibits the practice of repatriating refugees from the civil war
in El Salvador.2 8 The right of non-return contrasts with the established
right of non-refoulement, which prohibits the repatriation of refugees
who run the risk of persecution.2 The right of non-return grants tem-
porary refuge to persons seeking a safe haven from conditions of armed
conflict or hostilities where repatriation would subject them to a danger
of injury or death.3 0 The right of non-return attaches until the refugees'
own state can guarantee safe repatriation and protection from further
violence.3 1 Until such protection can be guaranteed, the refugees may
settle in any willing country that is able to ensure their safety and well-
being.32 While the right of non-return does not involve a permanent
ernment is unable to maintain law and order. Id. See Note, The Disproportionate
Effect of the Entry Fiction on Excludable Aliens, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 271, 293(1989) (stating that the asylum process has become politicized, especially in the routine
procedure of denials of asylum to Haitians and Salvadorans); see also Parker and Ney-
Ion, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 411, 413 (1989) (stating that even when recognizing violations of humanita-
rian or human rights laws abroad, courts have invoked the political question doctrine in
order to avoid interfering with the decision-making process or to avoid embarrassing
the governments involved); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (holding courts
must decline judicial review of cases involving political questions which are more prop-
erly decided by other branches of the federal government). Baker stands for the pro-
position that the determination of a nonjusticiable issue rests on a number of factors:
whether there is a constitutional commitment to a coordinate political branch to handle
the issue; whether there are judicially discoverable and manageable standards to re-
solve the issue; whether there is an initial need for a nonjudicial policy determination;
whether the resolution of the issue is impossible without undermining the constitutional
authority of another branch of the federal government; whether there is a need for
unquestioning adherence to a prior executive or legislative decision; and whether there
is the potential for embarrassment because of conflicting pronouncements made by the
executive or legislature on the same issue. Id. at 217.
28. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23 at 569.
29. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (defining non-refoulement).
30. UNHCR, Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, 40 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 12) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/40/12 (1985); Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23,
at 568-69 (contrasting Canadian and United States treatment of Salvadoran refugees).
But see Hailbronner, Non-Refoulement and 'Humanitarian' Refugees: Customary In-
ternational Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857, 866 (1986) (find-
ing state practice generally unsupportive of the concept of non-refoulement of refugees
from civil wars as a norm of customary international law, because states fear losing
control over their borders).
31. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 554.
32. Id. Third World countries almost never grant resettlement to refugees who
have found temporary protection elsewhere. Hailbronner, supra note 30, at 865 & n.40(citing Martin, Human Rights and the Movement of Persons, 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 346, 349 (1984)). Therefore, the asylum seeker must obtain a grant of indefinite
stay in the country of first refuge or face repatriation. Id. at n.40.
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asylum in the host country, it does forbid the forced repatriation of
refugees to territories where their lives or freedom are at risk.33
United States courts first recognized and applied the right of non-
return in an asylum case for three undocumented Salvadoran refu-
gees. 4 The Immigration Court for Washington, D.C. applied the right
of non-return and found that the respondents were not eligible for asy-
lum, but they did have the right not to be deported to their native
country of El Salvador for the duration of the civil war.35
This Note focuses on this novel application of the right of non-re-
turn. Part I examines the right of non-return as a norm of customary
international law. Part II discusses the first international treaties offer-
ing protection to war refugees, and examines past litigation on the issue
of granting the right of non-return in refugee asylum cases. Part III
focuses on the proceedings in In re Santos3 6 and the Immigration
Court's analysis. Part IV discusses the need for the Santos decision and
the effect of the Immigration Act of 1990,37 which granted Salvadoran
war refugees the right to temporary safe haven in the United States. 8
I. THE RIGHT OF NON-RETURN UNDER CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOES IT EXIST?
United States courts are expected to resort to international law as
precedent in cases where there is no clear controlling law.39 Where it is
33. Goodwin-Gill, Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J. IN 'L
L. 897, 902-03 (1986). But see Hailbronner, supra note 30, at 865-66 & n.41 (stating
that paragraph two, article three, of the United Nations Declaration on Territorial
Asylum allowed exceptions to the norm where national security concerns or protection
of the host state's population was necessary, as might occur with a mass influx of
refugees).
34. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, 15-16 (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.)(Aug. 24, 1990).
35. Id. at 16.
36. Id at 15-16.
37. 8 U.S.C.A. §1254a (West Supp. 1991).
38. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 303, 104 Stat. 5030, 5084
(1990). Bills that provided temporary safe haven for Salvadorans were first introduced
in Congress in 1983. H.R. 4447, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REc. H10,191
(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983); S. 2131, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CoNG. REc. S16,606
(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983).
39. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (holding that a standard prac-
ticed out of mutual respect and goodwill becomes a rule of international law by "the
general assent of civilized nations"). In Paquete, the American Navy seized boats be-
longing to Cuban coastal fishermen operating off the Florida coast during the Spanish-
American War. Id. at 678. The Supreme Court concluded that a customary norm re-
lating to fishing boats evolved over time as an exception to the practice of seizing ves-
sels during wartime. Id. at 708. Bease coastal fishing boats supplied only the local
economy and did not contribute to the war effort, they were exempt from seizure on
humanitarian grounds. Id. at 707. Therefore, the Court found that the illegal seizure of
1991]
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appropriate to apply international law, 0 the courts are authorized to
apply it with the same precedential weight as federal common law.41
The United States Supreme Court defines the sources of international
law as the works of legal authorities, the general usage and practice of
nations, and the judicial decisions enforcing international law.42
A principle of law becomes a norm of customary international law if
it meets two requirements: many countries must follow it consistently,43
and the practicing countries must recognize it as a legal obligation.4 4 A
the fishing boats entitled the owners to receive damages for the violation of that newly
evolved norm of customary international law. Id. at 714. The Court stated that:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and,
as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of
labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat.
Id. at 700.
40. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964) (stat-
ing that courts invoke international law when the facts of the case demand it, and
whenever resort to it appears necessary).
41. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 623 (1983) (reiterating that international law is part of United States law);
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the law of na-
tions has always been a part of the federal common law); Buergenthal, The U.S. and
International Human Rights, 9 HuM. R-s. L.J. 141, 159 (1988) (stating that a rule of
international law that is binding on the United States has the status of federal common
law); Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law in the United
States, 10 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 450, 473-76 (1989) (describing the application of interna-
tional law in the framework of the federal common law system).
42. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820) (finding the
general consensus among legal commentators on the definition of the crime of piracy on
the high seas as providing a sufficient source of international law for prosecution under
a federal statute).
The Statute of the International Court of Justice defines the sources of international
law as:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of the rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945).
43. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 555-56.
44. Id. at 556; see also The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (West Germany v.
Den.; West Germany v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (holding that in order to determine
the existence of customary international law, courts must find that there is an extensive
and virtually uniform state practice which occurs out of a sense of legal obligation).
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has defined the elements of a
norm of customary international law as (1) a consistent state practice, (2) which is
[VOL. 7:145
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norm of customary international law does not have to be universally
followed to exist;45 however, a norm binds only those states that have
exercised it in the past.," Under the scope of international law, every
private citizen enjoys certain rights which may not be violated by the
individual's government and which will be recognized by any nation
practicing that norm. 7
Extensive state practice in the field of human rights, for instance, has
resulted in a prohibition against the infliction of torture and its emer-
gence as a norm of customary international law. 8 Several international
treaties codify the universal rejection of acts of torture and recognize
the prohibition as a legal obligation.49 This consensus has raised the
norm against torture to the status of jus cogens10 A norm of customary
international law falling under the status of jus cogens is binding on all
states. 51 No state is exempted from compliance, including those that do
not recognize the norm or have objected to its recognition as obliga-
tory. This is the case even in the absence of legislation recognizing
continued or repeated over a period of time, (3) a conviction that the practice is re-
quired under international law, and (4) acquiescence by other non-practicing states.
Parker and Neylon, supra note 27, at 417.
45. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 556; Parker and Neylon, supra note
27, at 417.
46. Parker and Neylon, supra note 27, at 418. A state may avoid becoming bound
by an emerging rule of customary international law, however, by consistently objecting
to its validity. Id. at 418. See also Stein, The Approach of a Different Drummer: The
Principle of the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.i. 457,
458 (1985) (stating that a country that persistently objects to a norm of customary
international law is not bound by it, as long as the country manifested the objection
during the emergence of the norm as a rule of customary international law).
47. Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that interna-
tional law confers fundamental rights upon citizens with respect to their own govern-
ment, and specifying that the right to be free from torture is among them).
48. See id. at 880 (holding that the infliction of torture by a state official violated a
universally recognized norm of the international law of human rights).
49. Id. at 881-84. The Court found that the United Nations Charter, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1033, T.S. No. 993, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/183 (1948), and the American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5, para. 2, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/ser. K/XVI/1.1,
doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 2, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), guaranteed the right of
freedom from torture. Id.
50. Parker and Neylon, supra note 27, at 415. A rule of jus cogens is derived from
principles that the legal conscience of mankind regards as indispensable to coexistence
in the international community. Id. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883 (stating that the
court had little difficulty in ascertaining the universal renunciation of torture in modern
state practice).
51. Parker and Neylon, supra note 27, at 416.
52. See Meron, Geneva Conventions as Customary International Law, 81 AJ.
INT'L L. 348, 350 (1987) (presenting jus cogens acts as a moral and legal barrier
against any detraction from the norm); Parker and Neylon, supra note 27, at 418-19
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the norm, or in the presence of a convention, treaty or other legislation
invalidating it.53
Supporters of a right of temporary refuge from war claim there is
proof of extensive state practice of that customary norm.54 The custom
of granting temporary refuge to persons fleeing internal conflicts in
their homelands has grown during the twentieth century. 55 France and
Great Britain together received over 200,000 Spanish Civil War refu-
gees during the 1930's.51 More recently, massive waves of refugees fled
from internal armed conflicts in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin
America. 57
The existence of opinio juris,58 or a conviction that the practice is
obligatory under international law, fulfills the second requirement for
the establishment of a norm of customary international law.59 Propo-
nents of the right of non-return point to several sources of opinio juris;
direct expressions of a legal obligation or of a legal right invoked by
states6" or international organizations,"' expressions of protest against
breaches62 and consistent acquiescence to the practice of the norm.6"
(defining jus cogens as a binding peremptory norm that invalidates any contravening
legislation).
53. Parker and Neylon, supra note 27, at 417-19, 427-31. Section 702 of the Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law (1987) states that a treaty is void if it
conflicts with a norm of international law which has the status of jus cogens. Id. at
430.
54. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 558-75.
55. Id. at 559. See also Khan, supra note 18, at 301-09 (describing instances of
flights of refugees in Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia in this century).
56. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 559 & n.32.
57. Id. at 559-68. In Africa, Somalia absorbed over 475,000 Ethiopian refugees by
1980. Id. at 560. The Sudan provided a safe haven for thousands of Ethiopians and
Chadians fleeing civil war, and Zambia and Zaire provided refuge since 1975 for tens
of thousands of Angolan civilians escaping that country's civil war. Id. at 560-61. In
Southeast Asia, thousands of Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese sought refuge in
Thailand. Id. at 562. Civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala displaced
thousands of people who fled to countries of temporary refuge throughout Latin
America, a large portion of which settled in Costa Rica, Mexico and Honduras. Id. at
567. See generally, Poor Men at the Gate, 318 ECONOMIST 9 (March 16, 1991) (pre-
dicting that economic pressures and overpopulation will increase migration of peoples
from poor third-world countries to the developed states of Europe and North America);
Waiting for the Next Wave, 318 ECONOMIST 42 (March 16, 1991) (stating that the
issue of increased numbers of migrants, refugees and foreign workers was a matter of
utmost concern in an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development confer-
ence held in Rome in March of 1991).
58. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276-77 (defining opiniojuris as
a sense that the practice of a customary norm of international law arises out of a legal
obligation).
59. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 555-56.
60. Id. at 577.
61. Id. at 585-87.
62. Id. at 578.
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Opponents, however, deny that sufficient uniform state practice of
the norm of non-return exists.64 They argue that efforts to include
clauses imposing the more limited norm of non-refoulement in interna-
tional conventions have failed due to resistance coming primarily from
the nations of Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East.65 In the crit-
ics' view, the practice of the norm of non-return emerges primarily
from humanitarian concerns.6 8 That practice, therefore, does not reflect
a binding obligation on the part of the states to extend a safe haven to
refugees who fall outside the protection afforded by the norm of non-
refoulement.67
II. PRIOR HISTORY
A. THE 1951 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 UNITED NATIONS PROTOCOL
In response to the growing need to protect refugees affected by, and
displaced by wars, the July, 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees68 (1951 Geneva Convention) defined the rights and
duties of refugees. The 1951 Geneva Convention protects only those
63. Id.
64. Hailbronner, supra note 30, at 867, 873-80.
65. Id. at 867. Hailbronner concedes, however, that the right of non-refoulement
exists as customary law in Western Europe, the Americas, and Africa, and is universal
customary law in the making in other regions of the world. Id. Attempts by interna-
tional organizations to impose an obligation on member states to grant asylum have
also failed. G. GOODWiN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-09 (1983).
In effect, no obligation exists under international law to grant asylum; present obliga-
tions under international treaties relate only to restrictions on deportation, through ex-
pulsion or extradition, of refugees. Caggiano, supra note 23, at 33.
66. Hailbronner, supra note 30, at 876.
67. Id. at 880.
68. 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1985, 19 U.S.T. 6529, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Geneva
Convention]. The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1988), as
amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980),
uses the 1951 Geneva Convention's definition of refugee:
[T]he term refugee shall apply to any person who . . . as a result of events
occurring before 1 January, 1951, and owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country, or who not having a nationality and being outside the country of
his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
1951 Geneva Convention, art. I, para. 2, 19 U.S.T. 6529, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189
U.N.T.S. 137.
Refugees falling under the definition of the 1951 Geneva Convention are commonly
referred to as "Convention refugees." Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 558 &
n.28.
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refugees affected by events occurring prior to January 1, 1951."6 The
United Nations Protocol of 1967 (1967 Protocol) extended the cover-
age to events occurring after that date.70 The 1967 Protocol includes a
principle of non-refoulement which prohibits a host state from re-
turning a refugee to a country where the refugee would face persecu-
tion.71 Under non-refoulement, however, the refugee must qualify
under one of the enumerated grounds that constitute persecution: race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or politi-
cal opinion.72
Neither the 1951 Geneva Convention nor the 1967 Protocol grants
protection to persons victimized and displaced by famine, drought, or
civil war.73 These refugees do not meet the traditional definition of
"refugee" under the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol
because they do not face persecution on account of one of the enumer-
ated grounds.74 Nevertheless, these "humanitarian refugees" vastly
outnumber "Convention refugees. 73 Many of the United Nations'
member-states are reluctant to accept "humanitarian refugees" be-
cause they do not want to commit themselves to an obligation of uncer-
tain scope that depends largely on events outside of their control.76
Some countries, however, have undertaken regional efforts to
broaden the definition of refugee in order to provide protection for indi-
viduals whose situations are not covered by the enumerated grounds.1
69. 1951 Geneva Convention, art. 1, para. 2, 19 U.S.T. 6529, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,
189 U.N.T.S. 137.
70. 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]; Goodwin-Gill,
supra note 33, at 897-98 and n.3.
71. Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention obliges contracting states not to
"refouler" or deport a refugee to territories where his or her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion. 1951 Geneva Convention, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6529,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. In contrast to the right of non-return, the nar-
rower right of non-refoulement requires a recognition of the refugee's status as falling
under one of the aforementioned enumerated grounds. Perluss and Hartman, supra
note 23, at 599. The norm of non-return applies to all refugees falling outside those
groups, since otherwise they would be eligible for asylum protection. Id.
72. See id. (defining non-refoulement).
73. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 33, at 898.
74. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 599.
75. Hailbronner, supra note 30, at 857-58; UNHCR, Annual Report to the United
Nations General Assembly, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/40/12
(1985).
76. Khan, supra note 18, at 317-19.
77. See Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 590 (discussing the Organization
of African Unity's expanded definition of "refugee"); Goodwin-Gill, supra note 33, at
901 (noting the recommendations of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees to
expand the definition of "refugee" in Central American countries).
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The 1969 Organization for African Unity Convention on Refugee
Problems in Africa 7  expanded the definition of 'refugee' to include
persons who flee their countries on account of foreign aggression, occu-
pation, or serious disturbances of the public order. 9 The 1984 Carta-
gena Declaration on Refugees, endorsed by ten Latin American coun-
tries, urged expanding the definition of "refugee" to encompass persons
who flee their country because of "threats of generalized violence,"
human rights violations, and "internal conflicts." 80 The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expressed the norm of
non-refoulement81 in jus cogens terms, thereby prohibiting a refugee's
deportation to a country at war regardless of whether the refugee meets
the 1951 Geneva Convention definition.82 Therefore, the UNHCR defi-
Only regional treaties, however, have addressed the prohibition on the mass expul-
sion of aliens. See Perruchoud, L'Expulsion en Masse dEtrangers, ANN AiRE FRAN-
CAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 681 (1988) (stating that no universal treaty or conven-
tion in existence prohibits the mass expulsion of aliens); see also American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 22, para. 9, O.A.S. Official Records, OEA/ser.
K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev.1, corr. 2, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (prohibiting the
mass expulsion of aliens); Protocol 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
art. 4, in force May 2, 1968, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 978 (prohibiting the mass expulsion
of aliens); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 12, para. 5, OAU
GAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.4 (1981), reprinted in T. Elias, AFRICA AND THE DEVELOPIEN-r
OF INTERNATIONAL LAWv 275 (2d ed. 1988) (prohibiting the mass expulsion of aliens).
But see Perruchoud at 681-82 (observing that these treaties contain several safeguards
exempting contracting parties in specific situations from complying with that prohibi-
tion); Yundt, International Law and the Latin American Refugee Crisis, 19 U. MIA,
INTER-AM. L.R. 137 (1987) (concluding that the present inter-American asylum sys-
tem is inadequate to deal with the mass exodus of refugees).
78. Organization for African Unity Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa,
Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45. The duty for the contracting states to grant tempo-
rary refuge, as determined by the conditions prevailing in the refugee's native country,
prohibits deportation where it would pose a danger to the refugee's life, liberty or well-
being under the grounds set forth in the Geneva Convention's definition of refugee and
in situations of disruption of the public order. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at
591.
79. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 33, at 900.
80. Colloquium of Cartagena, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of Nov. 22,
1984, at 34 (Geneva 1985) (sponsors of the Declaration included the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees and the states of Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela).
81. See Parker and Neylon, supra note 27, at 435-36 (discussing the right of non-
refoulement as a jus cogens norm). The right of non-refoulement derives from human
rights law and humanitarian law and, as a norm of jus cogens, it imposes an obligation
on all states not to deport refugees back to countries at war. Id.; see also Sepulveda, La
Proteccion de los Refugiados en America. Alcances y Limitaclones, ANUAruO
JURIDICO INTERAMERICANO 233, 248 (1982) (stating that the norm of non-refoulement
is an imperative right and a norm of jus cogens).
82. UNHCR, Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, 40 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 12) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/40/12 (1985). See Perluss and Hartman, supra
note 23, at 600 (noting that the UNHCR's statement is a "highly significant and pe-
remptory expression of the legally binding nature of temporary refuge"). The
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nition allows a war refugee to remain in safe haven without showing
specific persecution.8"
B. IN RE MEDINA
United States immigration courts confronted the issue of expanding
the definition of refugee in In re Medina.4 At the respondent's depor-
tation hearing, the immigration court had denied the respondent's re-
quest for asylum and withholding of deportation. 5 Alternatively, she
requested a stay of deportation 6 claiming that customary international
law barred her repatriation to El Salvador.87 The United States Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 8 addressed the issue on appeal of
whether the same protection extended to "Convention refugees" should
extend under customary international law to either civil war refugees
or displaced persons uprooted by internal armed conflicts.89 In addition,
the BIA examined whether the Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War ° (the Fourth Geneva Con-
UNHCR's definition of non-refoulement has engendered some confusion because it
goes beyond the traditional scope of non-refoulement to include the prohibition of re-
turning refugees to a country where they may fear "serious dangers resulting from
conditions of civil strife." Id. See also Parker and Neylon, supra note 27, at 413-14
(listing freedom from torture, genocide, human rights violations, apartheid, the right to
life, and the rights of refugees as norms of jus cogens).
83. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 600.
84. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 (B.I.A. 1988).
85. Id. at 2.
86. Id. at 3. The respondent requested what amounted to extended voluntary de-
parture (EVD). Id. The Executive bestows EVD on designated aliens pursuant to a
determination that deportation would place them in a life-threatening situation. Note,
Temporary Safe Haven for De Facto Refugees from War, Violence and Disasters, 28
VA. J. INT'L L. 509, 522 (1988). See infra notes 113, 115 (discussing extended volun-
tary departure).
87. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 3 (B.I.A. 1988).
88. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (1991) (providing the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) with jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions rendered by the immigration
courts).
89. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 2-3 (B.I.A. 1988).
90. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3,365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Fourth Geneva Convention]. Three other treaties signed on that date, together with the
Fourth Geneva Convention, form the Geneva Conventions of 1949: Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3,362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No.
3,363, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War, Aug, 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3,316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter jointly cited as the Geneva Conventions of 1949].
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vention) provided relief from deportation for the respondent.' 1 The BIA
held that neither articles 1 or 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention nor
customary international law extend relief from deportation to refugees
who fall outside the protection provided by the Refugee Act. 2 The
BIA also held that it did not have jurisdiction to withhold deportation
or extend voluntary departure for persons who did not meet the defini-
tion of refugee under section 101(a)(42) of the Refugee Act.13
In Medina, the BIA advanced several reasons for refusing to grant
the right of non-return to persons who did not meet the 1951 Geneva
Convention and the Refugee Act definition of "refugee". 9 ' First, the
BIA found that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied almost exclu-
sively to conflicts of international character" and only article 3 ad-
dressed conflicts of non-international character such as the civil war in
El Salvador. 96 The BIA stated that the respondent had no recourse
91. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 20 (B.I.A. 1988). The respondent conceded
facts which established her deportability. Id. at 2. She applied at her deportation hear-
ing for asylum and withholding of deportation under the INA. Id. In the alternative,
she sought relief from deportation under the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion and under customary international law, claiming states are prohibited from repa-
triating war refugees. Id. at 14. The immigration judge found that the United States
was bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention as a contracting party, and that articles 1
and 3 of the Convention provided a basis for denying deportation. Id. at 3. Neverthe-
less the court held that the respondent failed to meet the burden of showing that El
Salvador was violating the Fourth Geneva Convention, and denied the withholding
from deportation. Id.
92. Id. at 20.
93. Id. at 13; see 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1991) (delineating the jurisdiction of the BIA).
94. See infra notes 96-115 and accompanying text (enumerating the BIA's reasons
for refusing to grant the right of non-return to persons who did not meet the definition
of "refugee").
95. But see Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 606-07 (asserting that state
practice under the Fourth Geneva Convention has defined the duty not to deport refu-
gees back to internal conflict zones).
96. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078, 4 (B.I.A. 1988). In 1977, the United Nations
adopted the provisions of article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention in a treaty that
addressed non-international armed conflicts. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of August 12, 1949, on the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, inforce Dec. 7, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex 11 (1977), reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 reads in part:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall
be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all circum-
stances be treated humanely. . . . To this end, the following acts are and
shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with re-
spect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
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under article 3 because article 3 binds only the parties to a conflict, and
the respondent did not allege the United States was a participant in the
civil war.97 Even if the United States had been a participant, the con-
flict would not have fallen within the scope of article 3 because conflicts
between two contracting parties are deemed to be conflicts of an inter-
national character.98 The BIA stated further that the language of arti-
cle 1 does not indicate an intent to provide individuals with a private
cause of action; therefore, it does not grant private rights of enforce-
ment in the absence of congressional implementation of enabling
legislation.99
After demonstrating the inapplicability of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention, the BIA confronted the validity of respondent's argument
based on the norm of non-return. 0 The respondent argued that the
state practice of providing safe haven to war refugees now enabled her
to seek withholding of deportation normally granted only to "Conven-
tion refugees."'' 1 The court addressed three issues: (1) whether such a
norm of customary international law exists; (2) whether controlling leg-
islation exists which supersedes that norm; and, if not, (3) whether cus-
tomary international law may provide relief from deportation for the
respondent.'0 2
The BIA applied the established two factor test to determine the ex-
istence of a customary norm of international law.' 03 The first factor
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions with-
out previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by the civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Fourth Geneva Convention, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3,365, 74
U.N.T.S. 287.
97. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 7 (B.I.A. 1988). An International Court of
Justice decision, however, found that the Fourth Geneva Convention embodies custom-
ary norms which are binding on all states, even those states not participating in the
conflict in question. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgement of June 27).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 10. Congress has not enacted legislation that would create a private cause
of action for persons in respondent's situation. Id. at 12. The court stated that Tempo-
rary Protected Status (TPS) legislation has not created an individual remedy in depor-
tation proceedings for persons in respondent's situation. Id. See infra notes 174-185
and accompanying text (explaining the impact of TPS on war refugees in the United
States).
100. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 14-19 (B.I.A. 1988).
101. Id. at 3, 14.
102. Id. at 15.
103. Id.
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requires a consistent state practice of the custom."' The second factor
requires a conviction that the rule is obligatory under international
law.105 The court found that the respondent failed to meet the second
factor because she did not demonstrate that nations grant temporary
refuge out of a sense of obligation under international law."' 0
The BIA based its finding on the traditional sovereign right of states
over their borders 107 and the failure of international treaties to include
persons displaced by civil wars in their definition of refugee. 08 The
BIA indicated, however, that proof of opinio juris of a binding norm of
customary international law would exist if an international diplomatic
conference convened and acknowledged that the norm's status was a
custom practiced obligatorily by many states.109 The BIA concluded
that the pronouncements on the right of non-return suggested that tem-
porary refuge was a humanitarian goal, rather than a present obliga-
tion practiced by the nations of the world.'
The BIA then analyzed the Refugee Act and categorized it as a con-
trolling act precluding the application of the right of non-return."' The
BIA found that Congress intended to provide comprehensive legislation
to establish a resettlement and relief program for refugees when it
adopted the Refugee Act.11 2
Next, the BIA found that even if customary international law pro-
vides a basis for the withholding of deportation, the immigration judge
does not have the authority to allow such a request.113 The BIA stated
104. Id. at 15. See Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 558-75 (delineating
extensive state practices of the norm of temporary refuge).
105. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 15 (B.I.A. 1988). See Perluss and Hart-
man, supra note 23, at 575-78 (noting different ways of proving the existence of opinio
juris).
106. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 15 (B.I.A. 1988).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 16.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 17.
112. Id. Section 101(b) of the Refugee Act of 1980 states:
[T]he objectives of the Act are to provide a permanent and systematic procedure
for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to
the United States, and provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the
effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(b), 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., and at 22 U.S.C. § 2601).
The Conference Committee Report stated that the bill of the Refugee Act, as
amended by the House of Representatives, incorporated the Geneva Convention's defi-
nition of refugee but rejected coverage of war refugees within its scope. H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 160.
113. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 18 (B.I.A. 1988).
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that neither Congress nor the attorney general have delegated to the
immigration judges the power to grant extended voluntary departure
(EVD). 11"4 Under the Refugee Act, that authority rests with the attor-
ney general,1 15 who has granted discretionary EVD in the past to na-
tionals of countries experiencing civil war or foreign aggression." 0
The issue of whether the customary international norm of non-return
provides a basis of relief from deportation for civil war refugees once
again confronted an immigration judge in In re Santos."' The respon-
dents in Santos defended their right to remain in the United States
under the right of non-return, even if their plight did not qualify them
for asylum under the Refugee Act." 8 The Immigration Court for
Washington, D.C. agreed, holding the civil strife in El Salvador did not
qualify the respondents for asylum but blocked their deportation until
such hostilities ceased."'
III. MATERIAL FACTS AND ANALYSIS IN IN RE SANTOS
The respondents, Maria Elena-Santos, along with her mother, Leo-
nor Santos-Trejo, and her son, Manuel Ramirez-Santos, lived in the
town of El Porvenir, El Salvador. 120 They testified that the civil war
had brutally disrupted the routine of their town, and that its inhabi-
tants were subjected to bombings, executions, threats of death, and vio-
lence. 2' The majority of individuals allegedly responsible for these acts
114. Id. at 19. The immigration courts can grant voluntary departure, which
presumes that the respondent will promptly leave the United States. Id. The power to
grant extended voluntary departure, which presumes that the respondent wishes to re-
main in the United States for an indefinite period, has not been delegated by the fed-
eral government to the immigration courts. Id. See generally Note, Temporary Safe
Haven for De Facto Refugees from War, Violence and Disasters, 28 VA. J. INT'L L.A.
509 (1988) (examining extended voluntary departure and temporary safe haven for
war refugees).
115. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1252(b) (1988).
116. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 19 (B.I.A. 1988). In several instances the
federal government granted blanket extended voluntary departure (EVD) to nationals
of certain countries reporting widespread violence inflicted on their civilian population.
The EVD permits such nationals to remain temporarily in the United States until the
hostilities cease and the refugees can return safely. COMM. ON RULES REPORT, supra
note 24, at 3. Citizens from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia, Chile,
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Lebanon, Ethiopia, Uganda, Iran, Nicaragua, Afghanistan
and Poland have benefitted from grants of EVD. Id. at 3-4.
117. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 4 (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.) (decided Aug. 24,
1990).
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 4.
121. Id.
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went unpunished because of the collapse of the local administrative and
judicial systems.'22
The respondents' fear for their safety and their deteriorating eco-
nomic situation led them to sell their possessions and flee the coun-
try.1 23 They testified that if they were compelled to return to El Salva-
dor, they would be forced to aid one of the sides in the conflict, and
that would put their lives in serious jeopardy.12' The respondents re-
quested asylum under section 208(a) 2 5 of the Refugee Act, withhold-
ing of deportation under section 243(h),' 2' and voluntary departure
under section 244(e). 27 In the alternative, they asked for a recognition
of their right to flee war, based on humanitarian law 28 and the doc-
trine of necessity. 2' Humanitarian law is applied in situations of inter-
national or civil armed conflicts to guarantee the protection of the
rights of the victims of those wars."" The recognition of those rights
would preclude the deportation of the respondents to El Salvador for
the duration of the civil war.' 3 1
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) argued that re-
lief under the Refugee Act was the exclusive remedy available to the
respondents. l 2 The immigration judge accordingly denied asylum
under the Refugee Act on the grounds that the respondents failed to
122. Id. at 4-5.
123. Id. at 5.
124. Id. at 5. See CoMim. ON RULES REPORT, supra note 24, at 5 (relating that
private agencies in El Salvador report that in a situation of civil war, both sides in a
conflict are suspicious of persons who sought refuge abroad, regardless of the reason).
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
126. Id. at § 1253(h).
127. Id. at § 1254(e). In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781,
at 2 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.)
(decided Aug. 24, 1990).
128. Respondents' Brief in Support of Right to Flee War and Not To Be Repatri-
ated While The War Continues, at 4, In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No.
A29 564 781 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington,
D.C.)(decided Aug. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Respondents' Brief].
129. Id. at 8-11.
130. See infra note 135 (listing the main sources of international humanitarian
law).
131. Respondents' Brief, supra note 128, at 3.
132. The Immigration and Naturalization Service Trial Brief in Opposition to
"Finding of Non-Deportability", at 2, In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No.
A29 564 781 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington,
D.C.)(decided Aug. 24, 1990) [hereinafter INS Brief]; see In re Medina, I. & N. Dec.
3078 at 17-18 (B.I.A. 1988)(stating the INA, as implemented, is a controlling statute
that precludes the application of customary international law to create a potential rem-
edy from deportation).
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establish objective evidence of past persecution.' In addition, the
court found that they did not prove fear of persecution upon return to
El Salvador on account of any one of the enumerated grounds required
by the Refugee Act.""
Nevertheless, the immigration court decided that the respondents
would not be repatriated back to El Salvador because under customary
international law the respondents had the right not to be deported to a
country engaged in a civil war.' 35 The court held the respondents were
deportable but, based upon principles of humanitarian law, they would
be sent to a third country, not at war, which would receive them and
guarantee their safety.'
36
IV. THE IMMIGRATION COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Medina, the BIA recognized that the right for temporary refuge
from war emerged in the context of principles of humanitarian law,
and that right reflected a general concern for the well-being of war
refugees.137 The BIA, however, rejected the right of non-return as a
norm of customary international law because, in its view, state practice
and opinio juris did not support that conclusion. 38 The BIA also held
that the Refugee Act was controlling legislation which precluded the
application of the norm of non-return. 3 9 The BIA concluded that war
refugees were not entitled to the same benefits as those provided to
133. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 5-6 (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.)(decided Aug. 24,
1990).
134. Id. at 6. See In re Sanchez and Escobar, I. & N. Dec. 2996 (B.I.A. 1985)
(concluding that harm resulting from civil war and anarchy does not constitute perse-
cution, under the definition of "refugee" in § 1 101 (a)(42)(A) of the INA, based on the
pre-1980 construction of the word "persecution" and on legislative rejection of the in-
clusion of "displaced persons" as persons who escape violent conditions caused by civil
strife in a country).
135. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 16 (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.)(decided Aug. 24,
1990).
136. Id. Humanitarian law protects the victims of armed conflicts and regulates the
conduct of all parties to an armed conflict. Its primary sources are: a) the Hague Con-
vention of 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539, 205 Parry's T.S. 277 (instituting rules gov-
erning the conduct of armed conflict); b) the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note
89; c) the Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Convention of 1978, in force Dec. 7,
1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annex I (1977) (concerning international armed con-
flicts); and the Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Convention of 1949, in force Dec.
7, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144/Annex 11 (1977) (concerning civil wars); d) United
Nations resolutions; and e) rules of customary international law. Parker and Neylon,
supra note 27, at 432-33, n.129-33.
137. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078 at 16 (B.I.A. 1988).
138. Id. at 15-16.
139. Id. at 18.
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"Convention refugees" under the Refugee Act. 4 ' The BIA, however,
left open the issue of whether state practice and opinio juris supported
the inclusion of war refugees within the definition of refugee as ex-
pressed by the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol. 4"
The immigration judge in his initial analysis in Santos addressed this
issue and concluded that the right of non-return arises under humanita-
rian law, as a corollary to the doctrine of necessity.1 42 The immigration
court in Santos distinguished the BIA's holding in Medina, declaring
that present state practice established that the right of non-return
arises under the Fourth Geneva Convention and humanitarian law
generally. 43
The immigration court stated that respondents met the standards set
forth in Medina for proving the existence of a norm of customary inter-
national law.144 The court maintained that the expert witnesses con-
vened at the trial, in conjunction with the evidence of state practice and
opinio juris gathered as proof, established the present state of the right
of non-return. 45 The court in Santos, however, stated that respondents
were not entitled to the same benefits as "Convention refugees" entitled
to asylum under the Refugee Act. 46 The respondents in Santos were
only entitled to a minimal right to remain in the United States while
the civil war in El Salvador persisted. 4
7
The court reasoned that the doctrine of necessity justified the flight
of the refugees in the same way that necessity allows a ship in distress
the right of entry to any port.'4 8 The court analogized the right of safe
passage with the right of necessitas vincit legem,149 which dictates that
extenuating circumstances allow the crossing of property lines and does
not constitute trespass. 50 The court determined that the existence of
armed conflicts and human rights violations presumes a humanitarian
need for a safe haven.' 5' The immigration judge did not hold the re-
140. Id. at 20.
141. Id. at 16.
142. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 9 (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.) (decided Aug. 24,
1990).
143. Id. at 9-10.
144. Id. at 10.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 13.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 9.
149. Id.; BLACK's LAW DICrIoNARY 1030 (6th ed. 1990) (defining necessitas vincit
legem as the "necessity overcomes the law."
150. Id.
151. Id. at 8. See also Respondent's Brief, supra note 128 (quoting Daniel Jacoby,
Secr~taire G6n6ral de la F&16ration Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, for the pro-
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spondents could remain in the United States, and specifically ordered
their deportation to a third country not at war. 152 The practical effect
of the immigration court's decision, however, was to allow the respon-
dents to remain in the United States because of the small likelihood of
a third country granting them temporary refuge.153
The immigration court next addressed the tension between a govern-
ment's sovereign power to restrict the movement of persons across its
borders and the right of non-return. 5 4 Historically, wartime migrations
of refugees justified non-compliance with traditional state rights of sov-
ereignty over borders.'5 5 The right of non-return, therefore, is consis-
tent with the traditional concepts of territorial sovereignty because it
imposes on the host state only a passive obligation not to deport the
refugees back to a country at war. 156 The court stated that this obliga-
tion is only temporary, lasting only until the end of the conflict creating
the right of non-return. 15
The court then confronted the issue raised in Medina of whether the
immigration courts have jurisdiction to grant relief under the right of
non-return.' 58 The court determined that the immigration courts in fact
have exclusive jurisdiction by statute to decide questions of deportation
at that stage.'59
position that armed conflict presents a prima facie risk to the lives and well-being of
civilians).
152. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 16 (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.) (decided Aug. 24,
1990).
153. See Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 598 (indicating the lack of reset-
tlement opportunities in third countries).
154. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 13 (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.) (decided Aug. 24,
1990).
155. Id. at 9.
156. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 618.
157. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 13 (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.) (decided Aug. 24,
1990).
158. Id. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text (addressing the BIA's
discussion of whether the immigration courts have jurisdiction to confer relief of with-
holding of deportation under the norm of non-return).
159. Id. at 14. The immigration court stated that proceedings before the immigra-
tion judge "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability
of an alien. . . " 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988); that "the immigration judge shall have
the authority to determine deportability and to make decisions, including orders of de-
portation;... to take any other action consistent with applicable law and regulations as
may be appropriate." 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a) (1991); and that "[t]he order of the special
inquiry officer shall direct the respondent's deportation, or the termination of the pro-
ceedings, or such other disposition of the case as may be appropriate." 8 C.F.R. §
242.18(c) (1991).
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Finally, the court set forth a two-part test to evaluate the merits of
other war refugees' requests for relief under the right of non-return. 160
The test placed the burden of proof on the war refugees to show that
their flight was motivated by war.1"' Initially, the war refugee has the
burden of showing that his or her country of origin is undergoing a civil
war,162 which creates a presumption of humanitarian need, and he or
she must then show a nexus between the existence of war and their
need to flee the country. 63 The immigration court found that the re-
spondents in Santos satisfied the two-part test and adequately proved
that they were victimized by the on-going civil war in El Salvador.""
The respondents also provided ample proof that repatriation would ex-
pose them to a risk of harm or death."6 5
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The right of non-return was recognized in Santos because domestic
law did not protect civil war refugees from forced repatriation. The
requirement of proof of persecution under the Refugee Act entitles
"Convention refugees" to non-refoulement or asylum, but does not pro-
tect "humanitarian refugees" who flee war. This difference ignores the
impending peril these "humanitarian refugees" face if forced to return
to their native countries. Therefore, the right of non-return fills the gap
created by that distinction by prohibiting deportation to a country un-
dergoing civil war. The norm of non-return exhibits the values ex-
pressed by humanitarian laws with respect to the protection and secur-
ity of the person in time of war. 66 Humanitarian law balances
necessity and humanity,1 67 and the doctrine of necessity has deep roots
in the laws governing warfare.16 8 The right to flee war which the re-
spondents claimed in Santos is necessary because the refugee's own
state cannot provide protection from the effects of the war to that indi-
160. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 14-15 (U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.) (decided Aug.
24, 1990).
161. Id. at 14.
162. Id.
163. Id. The nexus can be satisfied by a showing of circumstances where the re-
spondents were harmed or kidnapped or where their family members, or people in simi-
lar situations, were killed, harmed or kidnapped and the government offered no protec-
tion. Id.
164. Id. at 15.
165. Id.
166. Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 602.
167. Id. at 620.
168. Id. at 602.
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vidual.16 9 Opponents of this grant of protection, however, can raise
strong arguments for denying the right of non-return to civil war refu-
gees. First, the immigration courts may not recognize the right of non-
return as a norm of customary international law. Secondly, and most
important, immigration courts may find legislation that precludes the
application of customary international law.
The INA requires enforcement of all sources of law which relate to
the immigration and naturalization of aliens, including customary in-
ternational law.17 0 Statutes such as the INA must be interpreted to
conform with international law, unless Congress clearly intended to su-
persede international law.' In fact, Congress excluded war refugees
from the scope of the Refugee Act.'7 2 Recently, however, Congress ad-
dressed the issue of providing temporary refuge for persons displaced
by ongoing armed conflict in their homelands. Through section 302 of
the Immigration Act of 1990 (Immigration Act), 7 ' Congress amended
the INA to allow the attorney general to grant temporary protected
status (TPS) to nationals of states where an ongoing armed conflict
within the state would pose a serious threat to the safety of any alien
required to return to that state.'7 4 As a practical matter this develop-
ment will render it more difficult for a refugee to seek relief from de-
169. Id.
170. See In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 7-8 (U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.) (decided Aug.
24, 1990) (citing cases where the BIA interpreted and followed international law); 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988) (discussing the enforcement of all laws pertaining to immi-
gration and naturalization); 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(17) (1988) (defining immigration laws
as "all laws, conventions and treaties of the United States relating to the immigration,
exclusion, deportation or expulsion of aliens."); Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103
(4th Cir. 1982) (stating that in order to determine what Congress authorized, one must
consider customary international law to which the United States subscribes).
171. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982).
172. In re Medina, I. & N. Dec. 3078, at 18 (B.I.A. 1988). Congress implemented
the Refugee Act of 1980 in part to bring United States asylum laws in conformity with
the 1967 Protocol. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987); H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 160. See supra note 111 (stating that Congress considered coverage of war refu-
gees under the Refugee Act of 1980).
173. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254a (West Supp. 1991).
174. Id. The United States granted temporary protected status to Salvadorans
physically present in the United States as of September 19, 1990, and who registered
for temporary protected status between January 1, 1991 and June 30, 1991. Immigra-
tion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §303(a)(2), (b)(1)(C), 104 Stat. 5030, 5084
(1990). One of the key sponsors of the bill, U.S. Rep. Joe Moakley (D-Mass.), pushed
for an extension of the enrollment deadline by four months, alleging that the excessive
cost of filing fees caused a slowdown in registration. Kamen, Immigration Fees Slashed
For Eligible Salvadorans, Wash. Post, May 18, 1991, at B5. In March of 1991 the
attorney general designated the citizens of Kuwait, Lebanon and Liberia as eligible for
temporary protected status. 56 Fed. Reg. 12,745-47 (1991).
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portation under the customary norm of non-return. The United States
Supreme Court has stated that customary international law is applied
to fill the gaps between existing treaties, statutes and judicial deci-
sions. 17 5 The amendment of the Immigration Act to the INA could
constitute a definitive statement of the controlling legislative and exec-
utive act which precludes the application of customary international
law. 17
Under the Immigration Act, the attorney general also has the right
to designate citizens of a foreign state eligible for TPS where natural
disaster or other extraordinary and temporary conditions make repatri-
ation unsafe. 177 This approach represents a positive step toward recog-
nition that necessity forces endangered civilian populations to seek re-
lief not only from wars, but also from droughts and other natural
disasters. "
The question then becomes whether the TPS legislation moves the
United States toward compliance with international law and the norm
of non-return; TPS certainly gives refugees from the states designated
by the attorney general greater benefits than the right of non-return.
TPS gives them a right to remain in the United States,179 permission to
work for a period of time, 80 and permission to travel.181 In addition,
TPS legislation brings United States refugee law closer to the
UNHCR's position on non-refoulemen"1 2 by rejecting the requirement
of specific persecution.
Nevertheless, TPS falls short of the UNHCR's definition because it
reserves the right to designate countries eligible for relief under the
Immigration Act to the attorney general. Therefore, war refugees who
meet the Santos test of eligibility for temporary refuge might not be-
come eligible for temporary refuge under TPS, because of the Act's
grant of discretionary power to the attorney general. Thus, although
175. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that courts
should resort to the customs of nations in the absence of a treaty or controlling execu-
tive or legislative act or judicial decision).
176. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text (stating the BIA found the
INA to be a controlling legislative act which precluded the application of the norm of
non-return).
177. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254a(b)(B)-(C) (West Supp. 1991).
178. But see Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 611-12 (noting that refugees
of natural disasters are not entitled to the same protection of temporary refuge as are
the refugees of civil wars).
179. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254a(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1991).
180. Id. at §§ 1254a(a)(1)(B), (a)(2).
181. Id. at §§ 1254a(c)(4)(A), (0(3).
182. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the UNHCR's defini-
tion of non-refoulement).
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Congress has granted benefits to designated war refugees through the
Immigration Act, future temporary refuge seekers could still invoke the
norm of non-return in defense of their right to flee war. The norm of
non-return as pronounced in Santos does not ask for asylum benefits or
even TPS benefits. The refugee only asks for the minimal right to a
safe haven from war. Certainly, the advent of TPS has made that ap-
proach more difficult because, just as Medina interpreted the Refugee
Act as controlling legislation, immigration courts may interpret TPS
legislation as the controlling law regarding war refugees. 183
Finally, the attorney general, a political appointee, holds full deci-
sion-making authority for the country-designation process under
TPS. 1'8 Therefore, government foreign policy considerations may influ-
ence the process.185 Consequently, possible disparate treatment of the
country-designation process can still make the norm of non-return a
viable defense of the right to flee war and to seek temporary refuge.
183. See supra note 111 (stating that Congress intended to provide comprehensive
and uniform procedures regarding the resettlement of refugees when it passed the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980).
184. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254a (a)(1)(A)-(B) (West Supp. 1991).
185. See Stipulated Settlement Agreement, American Baptist Churches v. Thorn-
burgh, Civ. No. C-85-3255 RFP at 1 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (noting that Salvadoran and
Guatemalan citizens in the United States raised challenges to the processing of their
asylum claims pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980). The settlement stated in part:
foreign policy and border enforcement considerations are not relevant to the de-
termination of whether an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of perse-
cution; the fact that the individual is from a country whose government the
United States supports or with which it has favorable relations is not relevant to
the determination of whether an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of
persecution; whether or not the United States government agrees with the politi-
cal or ideological beliefs of the individual is not relevant to the determination of
whether an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution; the same
standard for determining whether or not an applicant has a well-founded fear of
persecution applies to Salvadorans and Guatemalans as applies to all other
nationalities.
Id. at 2.
Salvadorans in the United States as of September 19, 1990, and Guatemalans in the
United States as of October 1, 1990, are eligible for de novo adjudication of their
asylum claims. Id. at 4. Thus, even though In re Santos was appealed by both parties,
the appeal is closed administratively until the respondents' asylum claim is reheard.
See also Mathews, 500,000 Immigrants Granted Legal Status, Wash. Post, Dec. 20,
1990, at Al (reporting the federal government agreed to settle a case with over 80
religious and refugee organizations and reconsider political asylum requests from Sal-
vadoran and Guatemalan immigrants). The settlement terminates all deportation pro-
ceedings of Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants until their cases can be reheard.
Id. The suit charged that the government discriminated in the adjudication of the asy-
lum process by weighing ideological considerations. Id. at A19. In 1986, the INS
granted asylum to 53.6 percent of all applicants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, and to 64.3 percent of all applicants from China, but only 4.6 percent of
Salvadorans, 2.3 percent of Guatemalans and zero percent of Hondurans obtained asy-
lum. Comment, supra note 18, at 265-66; Perluss and Hartman, supra note 23, at 616.
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CONCLUSION
All refugee law concerns a right to flee life-threatening circum-
stances, whether that threat is ecological disaster, famine or war. The
recognition and application of the right of non-return preserves that
moral right in the context of war. The respondents in Santos conceded
deportability, but they denied deportability to El Salvador in particu-
lar, because in their homeland their well-being and freedom would be
at risk.
While asylum is a durable remedy, the right of non-return claimed
by the respondents in Santos is only a temporary remedy. In the hier-
archy of remedies available in refugee and asylum law, the right of
non-return is the least intrusive on the sovereignty of the host country.
The right only obliges the host country not to return the refugee to a
country at war.le8 Refugees who flee war or drought certainly do not
have a right to permanent asylum in another state if they cannot show
a fear of persecution. These refugees, however, certainly have a right
under humanitarian and customary international law not to be de-
ported back to their drought-stricken or war-torn homeland.
186. In re Santos in Deportation Proceedings, No. A29 564 781, at 13 (U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Rev., Washington, D.C.) (decided Aug. 24,
1990).
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